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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
AND CALIFORNIA’S LOW CARBON 
FUEL STANDARD 
Kathryn Abbott* 
California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), enacted as part of the 
State’s pioneering Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), purports to regulate 
the amount of carbon emissions associated with fuels consumed in the state. Part 
of this scheme involves assigning numeric scores to vehicle fuels reflecting the 
amount of carbon emissions associated with their production, transportation, and 
use. The scores are part of a “cap-and-trade” scheme to lower the state’s total 
amount of carbon emissions associated with fuel use. Out-of-state industry 
groups brought a challenge in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of California, alleging that the LCFS violated the “dormant Commerce 
Clause” of the United States Constitution. The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of California agreed with the Plaintiffs, and issued a pre-
liminary injunction. On October 16, 2013, the Ninth Circuit reversed and 
remanded.  
 This Note describes the background of the dormant Commerce Clause and its 
application in previous environmental regulations. It then analyzes the argu-
ments on both sides of the challenge to California’s LCFS, and suggests a course 
of action for California and other states going forward to comply with the Con-
stitution in this developing area of law. Finally, this Note discusses the 
application of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to the scenario of global cli-
mate change, and the relevance of global warming as a critical issue that states 
can be allowed to regulate, especially when the federal government has not. 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 180 
 I. GLOBAL WARMING AND CALIFORNIA..................................... 184 
 II. THE LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD ...................................... 185 
 III. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE ........................... 187 
A. The Choice of Test ................................................................... 189 
B. Strict Scrutiny: Legitimate Local Purpose .................................... 190 
C. Very Legitimate Interests: Health and Safety Laws ...................... 192 
D. Strict Scrutiny: Reasonable Nondiscriminatory Alternatives .......... 195 
                                                                                                                      
* J.D. Candidate, University o� Michigan Law School, May 2014. Many thanks to 
University o� Michigan students Chris Eaton and Lauren Reid for their feedback and ideas. 
     
180 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 3:1 
E. The Pike Balancing Test .......................................................... 196 
F. Pike Balancing Test: Legitimate Local Purposes ............................ 197 
 IV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN FARMERS UNION CHALLENGE ................. 198 
A. Challenge in the Eastern District of California ............................ 200 
1. The Choice o� Test .......................................................... 201 
2. Legitimate Local Purpose .............................................. 208 
3. Extraterritoriality ........................................................... 214 
4. Alternatives .................................................................... 217 
B. Ninth Circuit Appeal ............................................................... 220 
C. Pike Arguments ....................................................................... 226 
 V. POLICY ALTERNATIVES .......................................................... 227 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 229 
INTRODUCTION 
All over the world, the natural environment is shifting. In the coming 
decades and centuries, scientists expect the changes to continue and accel-
erate. The shift is caused by global climate change spurred by the warming 
effect o� high levels of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere. In addition to rising temperatures worldwide, scientists predict 
increased likelihood of destabilizing effects, including “[c]ontraction of 
snow cover areas, increased thaw in permafrost regions, decrease in sea ice 
extent”; “[i]ncreased frequency o� hot extremes, heat waves and heavy 
precipitation”; “[i]ncrease in tropical cyclone intensity”; “[p]recipitation 
increases in high latitudes”; “[p]recipitation decreases in subtropical land 
regions”; and “decreased water resources in many semi-arid areas.”1 Many 
of these impacts are likely to affect California: it is the state with the third 
highest amount of coastline by length, all of which is subject to rising sea 
levels and resulting land loss.2 Climate change also threatens California’s 
water supply, such as through a decrease in the vital snow pack.3  
In the United States, transportation accounts for 28% of greenhouse gas 
emissions.4 For individuals, transportation makes up an even higher share 
of greenhouse gas emissions: the U.S. Government estimates that 51% of 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Climate Change: Effects, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., http://climate.na 
sa.gov/effects (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
 2. JANICE CHERYL BEAVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. INTERNATIONAL 
BORDERS: BRIEF FACTS, at CRS-3 to -4 (2006). The two states with longer coastlines are 
Alaska and Florida. 
 3. CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA, CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., (2007), available 
at http://www.water.ca.gov/climatechange/docs/062807factsheet.pdf. 
 4. National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html (last visited Oct. 9, 
2013). 
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each household’s “carbon footprint” results from transportation fuels.5 
Furthermore, each gallon of gasoline burned is estimated to result in twenty 
pounds of added carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.6 Worldwide, transpor-
tation is estimated to account for about 13% of total greenhouse gas 
emissions.7 Carbon in vehicle fuels, therefore, is an attractive point of at-
tack for policymakers interested in reducing carbon output.  
Despite these dire anticipated effects of climate change, policymakers 
at the federal level had largely failed to address climate change by the early 
2000s.8 The existing federal framework for regulating air pollutants proved 
inadequate to face the unique challenges posed by climate change: the 1970s 
Clean Air Act envisioned the regulation of “criteria pollutants” posing a 
direct danger to human health through inhalation.9 This framework failed 
to address climate change for several reasons.10 For example, the Clean Air 
Act applies to sources emitting just a few hundred tons of regulated pollu-
tants per year; given the large volumes of carbon dioxide emitted by 
individuals each year, many thousands of new sources would be brought 
under regulation immediately were the Clean Air Act to apply to green-
house gases.11 This was an administrative headache the EPA could not 
manage. As a result, it became clear that a new structure was needed to 
address the unique concerns, and overwhelming scope, of the climate 
change problem.12 It was also clear that the federal government was in no 
hurry to enact a solution.13  
                                                                                                                      
 5. Reduce Climate Change, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/ 
feg/climate.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
 6. Id. 
 7. Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Figure: Global Anthropogenic GHG emis-
sions, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/public 
ations_and_data/ar4/syr/en/figure-spm-3.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
 8. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, availa-
ble at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/101011fa_fact_lizza; see also Jason 
Dearen, Calif. on Verge of Major Greenhouse Gas Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 16, 
2010, available at http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/Dec/16/calif-on-verge-of-major-
greenhouse-gas-rules/?#article-copy. 
 9. Six Common Air Pollutants, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.ep 
a.gov/air/urbanair/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
 10. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change at EPA, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2012) 
(describing the political and administrative difficulties in applying the existing Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration [PSD] framework to climate change, which would “bring[] in 
many thousands of sources into the program for the first time all at once”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 2. 
 13. The Obama Administration has recently, as of this writing, begun to address 
climate change increasingly within the Clean Air Act. See, e.g., Justin Gillis, Obama Puts 
Legacy at Stake with Clean-Air Act, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), http://www.ny 
times.com/2013/06/26/science/earth/clean-air-act-reinterpreted-would-focus-on-flexibility-
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Facing this regulatory failure, California seized the opportunity to reg-
ulate greenhouse gases on its own. The State had long been a pioneer in 
environmental regulations. A key example of this leadership involved the 
regulation of mobile sources of air pollution in the 1970s in the Clean Air 
Act.14 Before the federal government undertook to regulate air pollution, 
California had already taken steps to control pollution from vehicles 
through motor vehicle emissions standards.15 Once the federal government 
passed the Clean Air Act and took control of air pollution, however, Section 
209 of the Act disallowed states from creating regulations on mobile sources 
more strict than those the federal government adopted, with the exception 
that California may apply for a waiver from the EPA in order to pursue a 
stricter standard for mobile sources.16 This provision shields multi-state 
commercial actors from the inefficiency o� having to comply with a patch-
work of different standards in order to sell cars nationwide. California, 
therefore, has long been a leader in environmental regulations, but federal 
authority sometimes reins in the State’s efforts in the interests of national 
consistency. 
The Clean Air Act stands primarily as an example o� federal authority: 
it centralized and nationalized the project of regulating air pollution in a 
uniform manner. It also reigned in state regulation in Section 209, when it 
disallowed states from regulating more stringently on their own, and 
capped California’s ability to do so. Nevertheless, it is a principle o� federal-
ism that states should be allowed to act as “laboratories” in which new 
policies are dreamed of and tested.17 This theory stems from a lengthy and 
passionate dissent of Justice Brandeis, in which he wrote that it is “one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”18 The idea of 
                                                                                                                      
and-state-level-efforts.html?pagewanted=all. California’s actions, discussed here, predated 
such efforts at the federal level.   
 14. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 
1183, 1196 n.65 (1995) (“Congress first adopted the special provision for California in the Air 
Quality Act of 1967 as a result of intense state lobbying. California had adopted motor 
vehicle emission standards long before the federal government adopted such standards, and 
thus the state led the way for federal standards.” (citation omitted)). 
 15. Id. 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)–(b); California Waivers and Authorizations, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/cafr.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). The 
statute does not list California by name, but states that “The Administrator shall . . . waive 
application of this section to any State which has adopted standards . . . for the control of 
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966.” 
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). Only California had done so. In effect, then, the statute singled 
California out. 
 17. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 18. Id. 
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“states as laboratories” is invoked as a matter of course in discussions o� 
federalism—especially by those supporting an embattled state policy.19 
Of course, as evidenced by California’s regulation of mobile sources be-
fore the Clean Air Act, there are some downsides to states’ abilities to act as 
laboratories. In the context of civil rights, for example, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection and due process guarantees have long cur-
tailed states’ authority to enact discriminatory laws.20 The federal 
government also tends to take over from states in situations where there 
might otherwise be a “race to the bottom,” or a system of incentives for 
states to compete for businesses by offering lower protections, such as for 
the environment.21  
In addition to the above policy considerations that explain the interac-
tion between state and federal regulators, the United States Constitution 
has long been interpreted to limit the authority of states to regulate major 
issues. The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the authority to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes.”22 Since the early nineteenth century, as this Note de-
scribes, that grant of authority has been interpreted as containing an  
implicit restriction of the states’ authority to regulate interstate commerce. 
In other words, that which Congress may regulate, the states may not. 
Therefore, states may not regulate areas, such as commerce, that are dele-
gated to Congress. This principle, as applied to the exclusive authority of 
Congress over the ability to regulate Commerce, is known as the dormant 
Commerce Clause.23  
This Note examines the history and current status of the dormant 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the applicability of the 
dormant Commerce Clause in the context of California’s efforts to control 
the emission of greenhouse gases. It analyzes one federal court’s finding 
that California’s regulations did violate the Constitution, and discusses the 
rejection of that reasoning on appeal at the Ninth Circuit. It argues that the 
                                                                                                                      
 19. See James A. Gardner, The “States-as-Laboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional 
Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475 (1996).  
 20. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 
(2003); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Brown v. Bd. o� Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 21. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and 
Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 581 (2007) (describing the 
Clean Air Act’s federal role in setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards as “a classic 
regulatory function of government, as is the prevention of ‘race to the bottom’ collective 
action problems that might ensue if regional authorities competed with one another for 
industry by progressively lowering pollution standards that could ultimately leave all worse 
of�”). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
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methods California used to reduce the “carbon intensity” of vehicle fuels 
are not facially invalid as discriminating against interstate commerce, and 
that the appropriate test in a legal challenge would be a balancing test, 
weighing California’s interest in the environment against the burdens it 
imposes on interstate commerce.  
More broadly, this Note discusses the emerging recognition of global 
climate change as a “legitimate local purpose.”24 With this recognition, it 
becomes more possible for states validly to use otherwise-illegal discrimina-
tory means to solve environmental problems. At the same time, the Note 
acknowledges the peculiar legal stance associated with this recognition.  
Another article in this issue describes the dormant Commerce Clause 
at length and provides a good deal o� background on the broader schemes 
California has used to curb global climate change. This Note delves more 
deeply into one regulatory regime used by California’s Air and Resources 
Board, which is known as the Low-Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS). This 
Note also deals specifically with the federal challenge to the LCFS, and the 
legal developments represented by that challenge. 
I. GLOBAL WARMING AND CALIFORNIA 
The risks California faces due to global warming have been well docu-
mented.25 In view of these concerns, the California legislature was anxious 
to craft legislation that would effectively reduce harmful impacts on Cali-
fornia.26 In addition, the legislature recognized the historic position 
California found itself in: it was keen to craft legislation that might serve as 
a model for the rest of the nation. Mary Nichols, the chairwoman of the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB), explained that California was 
trying to “fill the vacuum created by the failure of Congress to pass any 
kind of climate or energy legislation for many years now.”27 
At the end of these deliberations in 2006, California enacted the Global 
Warming Solutions Act, better known as Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32).28 The 
new law set several ambitious targets to dramatically reduce California’s 
climate change-inducing greenhouse gas emissions, such as requiring CARB 
“to adopt regulations to require the reporting and verification of statewide 
                                                                                                                      
 24. See infra Parts III(B), III(F), IV(A)(2). 
 25. See generally Reports on the Third Assessment from the California Climate Change 
Center, CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE PORTAL, CA.GOV, http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/ 
adaptation/third_assessment/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). The site also includes comprehen-
sive information about California’s coordinated efforts to adapt to climate change. 
 26. Dearen, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. Id. 
 28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 526, 
except Ch. 352, of 2013 Reg. Sess.).  
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greenhouse gas emissions and to monitor and enforce compliance with this 
program.”29 CARB was also required, among other things, to “adopt a 
statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit equivalent to the statewide green-
house gas emissions levels in 1990 to be achieved by 2020” and to adopt 
“rules and regulations in an open public process to achieve the maximum 
technologically feasible and cost-effective greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tions.”30   
II. THE LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD 
Pursuant to AB 32 and an executive order of Governor Schwarzeneg-
ger, CARB enacted the LCFS in 2007.31 The LCFS was to involve 
collaboration between multiple groups within California’s Environmental 
Protection Agency, the University of California, and others to establish a 
compliance schedule to meet AB 32’s aggressive 2020 target for 1990-level 
emissions.32 The LCFS was to reduce the amount of carbon emissions 
associated with vehicle fuels sold and consumed in California, as part of an 
array of regulations that would reduce California’s overall carbon emis-
sions.33 By establishing “carbon intensity ratings” for categories of vehicle 
fuels, the LCFS provided a metric for identifying how much carbon was 
associated with all types of vehicle fuels in the state.34  
The LCFS took a holistic view o� fuels’ carbon intensities, looking to 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with all stages of their production.35 
One factor in the score was the amount of transportation involved in the 
fuels’ consumption in California.36 This led to the result that out-of-state 
fuels chronically scored much higher than in-state fuels, although Midwest-
ern corn ethanol-based fuels and Brazilian sugarcane-based fuels also 
received top ratings by CARB.37  
The LCFS applies to any transportation fuel for sale in California.38 
One type of transportation fuel regulated under the LCFS, at the heart of 
the dispute in this paper, is ethanol, of which 98 percent is made from 
                                                                                                                      
 29. Assemb. B. 32, 2005–2006 Sess. (Cal. 2006).  
 30. Id.  
 31. Low Carbon Fuel Standard, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CA.GOV, http://www.ene 
rgy.ca.gov/low_carbon_fuel_standard (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480.3(b) (2012). 
 35. Kirk Tracy, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene: Low Carbon Fuel 
Standards, Lifecycle Greenhouse Gases, and California’s Continued Struggle to Lead the Way, 24 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 174 (2010). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480.1 (2012). 
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corn.39 Ethanol is an “alcohol-based fuel made by fermenting and distilling 
starch crops, such as corn”; the resulting ethanol can be used separately or 
mixed with traditional gasoline.40 The primary benefits of ethanol over 
gasoline are its lower carbon emissions (the LCFS’s primary concern), and 
its ability to reduce the need for imported oil.41 Corn destined to become 
ethanol for consumption in California is either shipped to California and 
processed into ethanol there, or produced elsewhere and shipped into Cali-
fornia as a finished product.42 The finished product “travels by truck or rail 
to facilities where it is blended with gasoline.”43  
The vehicle fuels regulated under the LCFS are assigned a “carbon in-
tensity” (CI) score, reflecting the amount of greenhouse-gas emissions 
associated both with the fuel itself as well as with the circumstances of its 
production.44 This CI score is assigned to categories of vehicle fuels as a 
matter of convenience, but producers may request a customized score from 
CARB if they wish, in a process known as “Method 2A or 2B.”45 For any 
such individualized CI score to be approved, “the regulated party must 
demonstrate that the method is . . . scientifically defensible.”46 Moreover, 
the Executive Officer of CARB is tasked with reviewing CI scores and may 
choose a value that “most closely corresponds” to the category, or “pathway,” 
for a particular “fuel or blendstock.”47 To determine the score, all aspects of 
the fuel’s “life cycle” are taken into account, including the geographic region 
in which the fuel was produced and the amount of distance the fuel was 
transported into California.48 The average categorical scores are changed 
yearly.49  
CARB was to begin reducing the total CI allowed in the state, begin-
ning by small increments in 2011 and going down a full 10 percent (to 90 
percent of existing values) by 2020.50 To this end, regulated parties were 
required to calculate their CI value, which would generate either a credit or 
deficit, depending on how much the party had reduced its CI score.51 Par-
                                                                                                                      
 39. Complaint for Declarative and Injunctive Relief at paras. 14–15, Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 109CV02234), 
2009 WL 5421971 [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 40. Ethanol, FUELECONOMY.GOV, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/ethanol.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
 41. Id. 
 42. Complaint, supra note 39, paras. 14–15. 
 43. Id. para. 15. 
 44. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95486 (2012).  
 45. Id. § 95486(c).  
 46. Id. § 95486(e).  
 47. Id. § 95486(a)(3)(A).   
 48. Id. § 95486(a)(2)(C)–(D). 
 49. Id. § 95486(b) tbl.8. 
 50. Id. § 95482. 
 51. Id. § 95485(a). 
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ties would then have the option to trade credits and deficits, resulting in a 
“cap-and-trade” scheme.52 
The LCFS contained a table, known as “Table 6,” or the “Carbon In-
tensity Lookup Table for Gasoline and Fuels that Substitute for 
Gasoline.”53 It gave a long list of categories o� fuels based on type and 
origin, each with a corresponding “Pathway Identifier.”54 These pathways 
each were assigned three scores for CI: a score for “Direct Emissions,” a 
score for the carbon intensity of “Land Use or Other Indirect Effect,” and a 
“Total” score.55 While it does not bear listing all of the scores here, some 
examples are that the total scores for “Midwest Average” was 99.40 grams 
of carbon dioxide per megajoule (gCO2e/MJ), compared with a “California 
Average” of 95.66 gCO2e/MJ.
56 The lowest average score on the list was 
“Landfill gas (bio-methane) cleaned up to pipeline quality NG [Natural 
Gas]; compressed in CA,” which had a CI value of 11.26 gCO2e/MJ.
57 In 
general, Brazilian sugarcane also received relatively low CI scores, such as 
58.40 gCO2e/MJ for “Brazilian sugarcane with average production process, 
mechanized harvesting and electricity co-product credit,” and 73.40 
gCO2e/MJ for “Brazilian sugarcane using average production processes.”
58 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the mechanics of the LCFS were not agreeable 
to industry groups and other interested parties—particularly those receiv-
ing relatively high CI scores in the Midwest, who perceived a protectionist, 
pro-California economic motivation. They proceeded to challenge the 
standard on the grounds that it violated the Commerce Clause of the Unit-
ed States Constitution, under the so-called “dormant Commerce Clause” 
theory.59  
III. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE 
Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution confers upon 
Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”60 The so-called 
                                                                                                                      
 52. Id. § 95485(c). Emissions trading, or “cap-and-trade,” is a market-based approach 
used to control pollution by providing economic incentives for achieving reductions in the 
emissions of pollutants. See ROBERT N. STAVINS, EXPERIENCE WITH MARKET-BASED 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 01-58, 
2001). 
 53. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95486(b) tbl.6. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See infra Part IV. 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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“dormant” or “negative” commerce doctrine, though o� long standing, does 
not appear in the text of the Constitution.61 Instead, it is the theory that no 
body other than Congress may regulate interstate or foreign commerce, as 
Congress holds exclusive power to do so in the text of the Constitution. 
Therefore, even when Congress has failed to act, no other body may legis-
late in the arena Congress has been delegated.62 
Chief Justice John Marshall was among the first to articulate this prin-
ciple. In Gibbons v. Ogden, he wrote that New York’s grant to individuals the 
exclusive rights to navigate the waters within the state was “repugnant” to 
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which “authorizes Congress 
to regulate commerce.”63 Marshall argued that the structure of the Consti-
tution could not withstand the ability of states to regulate interstate  
commerce: “If there were no power in the general government, to control 
this extreme belligerent legislation of the States, the powers of the govern-
ment were essentially deficient.”64 Finally, Marshall wrote that the 
assignment of the commerce power to Congress was “an investment of 
power for the general advantage” in Congress’s hands, “which power can 
never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the 
hands of agents, or lie dormant.”65 It is from this phrase that the “dormant” 
Commerce Clause draws its name. 
During the last two centuries, the Supreme Court has continued to ap-
ply the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court uses two tests to determine 
whether state action violates the dormant Commerce Clause. In the first, 
known as the “strict scrutiny” test, a court determines whether a state law 
discriminates purposefully, facially, or in effect against interstate com-
merce.66 The court will also determine whether the statute regulates 
“extraterritorially”—whether it seeks to control behavior occurring purely 
outside its borders.67 Statutes that discriminate or regulate extraterritorially 
are subject to “strict scrutiny,” and the state bears the burden of demonstrat-
ing “both that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose, and that this 
purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory 
means.”68  
                                                                                                                      
 61. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 338, 342–343 (2007).   
 62. See, e.g., id. 
 63. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 1 (1824).   
 64. Id. at 5. 
 65. Id. at 189. 
 66. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). 
 67. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 
700 F.3d 796, 807 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 68. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Statutes that discriminate only incidentally are subject to the Pike bal-
ancing test, named after Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. The Supreme Court 
established that statutes not discriminating on their face against interstate 
commerce “violate the Commerce Clause only if the burdens they impose 
on interstate trade are ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.’ ”69  
A. The Choice of Test 
The beginning of a dormant Commerce Clause analysis is the determi-
nation of which legal test is appropriate to evaluate the state law in 
question. First, the court must determine “whether the ordinance discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce.”70 Discrimination for these purposes 
“simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic 
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”71 If the court 
finds that “a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se 
invalid.”72 This is known as the “strict scrutiny” test, and it is so demanding 
that only one state law has ever survived it in the Supreme Court.73 Next, if 
the court finds that the ordinance itself does not discriminate, the court 
determines whether it “imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is 
‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’ ”74   
The determination of what constitutes “discrimination” arises from the 
statute on its face, its text, its purposes, and its effects. Broadly speaking, 
the statute is not discriminatory if it “regulates even-handedly to effectuate 
a legitimate local public interest.”75 Even though a statute can discriminate 
without a determination that its purpose is to discriminate, protectionism is 
an important piece of the logic here: the Supreme Court has identified the 
“crucial inquiry” as “whether [the law] is basically a protectionist measure, 
or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local con-
cerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.”76  
Even without facial discrimination—such as when a law, by its terms, 
applies evenly to everyone—the law may still discriminate against interstate 
commerce if it has discriminatory effects. For example, in Hunt v. Washing-
ton State Apple Advertising Commission, the Supreme Court held that a North 
Carolina law was discriminatory where it required apples sold in the state 
                                                                                                                      
 69. Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
 70. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). 
 71. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Envtl. Quality Comm’n, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).   
 72. Id. 
 73. See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 146 (discussed below). 
 74. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). 
 75. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.  
 76. City o� Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
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to bear only the USDA label.77 The law discriminated because “North Caro-
lina . . . had never established a grading and inspection system,” so “the 
statute had no effect on the existing practices o� North Carolina producers,” 
but “Washington growers and dealers . . . were forced to alter their long-
established procedures, at substantial cost, or abandon the North Carolina 
market.”78 Therefore, a law applying even-handedly to all parties might still 
discriminate if it has the effect of placing substantial barriers on interstate 
commerce without effectively furthering its “laudable goal” of protecting 
consumers from fraud.79  
Finally, the strict scrutiny test will be applied if the law regulates extra-
territorially—that is, if the state attempts to regulate behavior occurring 
beyond its borders. This doctrine of the Commerce Clause applies in two 
situations: where the state attempts to regulate “commerce that takes place 
wholly outside o�” its borders, “whether or not the commerce has effects 
within the state”; and where the statute “directly controls commerce occur-
ring wholly outside the boundaries o�” the state.80 The court will also 
consider whether the “statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory 
regimes of other States and what effect would arise” if more states adopted 
similar legislation in order to guard against the “projection of one state 
regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State.”81 In the extraterri-
toriality analysis, the “ ‘critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the 
regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.’ ”82  
B. Strict Scrutiny: Legitimate Local Purpose 
Once the court has determined that the strict scrutiny test is applicable, 
the first step in applying it is determining whether the State acted in fur-
therance of a compelling state interest or “legitimate local interest.”83 
However, in applying the strict scrutiny test, courts rarely dwell on the 
discussion of what constitutes a legitimate local interest.84 Instead, courts 
appear to presume that any purpose beyond simple economic protection-
                                                                                                                      
 77. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 340 (1977).   
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 353.  
 80. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1091 (E.D. Cal. 
2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 81. Id. at 1090. Courts phrase this consideration in terms of “economic Balkanization.” 
 82. Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)). 
 83. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994). 
 84. Courts differ in their choice of words for the test; satisfactory interests are de-
scribed either as “compelling” or “legitimate”; and the word “purpose” appears 
interchangeably with the word “interest.” For example, C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392, uses 
“legitimate local interest.” Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1970) uses both “com-
pelling state interest” and “legitimate local purpose.” 
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ism, and probably excluding otherwise illegal purposes, are valid.85 The case 
law is somewhat undeveloped at this step, because when strict scrutiny is 
applied, the statutes almost always fail for being discriminatory. Indeed, the 
strict scrutiny test is so demanding that discriminatory laws are said to be 
almost per se invalid.86 Therefore, courts rarely reach the discussion of what 
legitimate environmental local purposes might be; it is possible that all 
environmental purposes, so long as they do not stem from protectionism, 
are valid.87 
In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, the Supreme Court ap-
plied the strict scrutiny test and held that “a so-called flow control 
ordinance, which requires all solid waste to be processed at a designated 
transfer station before leaving the municipality” violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause because the ordinance “depriv[ed] competitors, including 
out-of-state firms, of access to a local market.”88 The “avowed purpose of 
the ordinance,” which was “to retain the processing fees charged at the 
transfer station to amortize the cost of the facility,” was not the sort o� 
legitimate local purpose a government must demonstrate in order to be able 
to discriminate.89 Further, even if the Court had accepted financing as a 
legitimate local purpose, the State must show that there were no other 
reasonable, non-discriminatory means to achieve that end.90  
Similarly, Oregon’s waste disposal regime, which subjected disposers of 
waste generated out-of-state to surcharges roughly three times higher than 
disposers of in-state waste, was facially invalid under the strict scrutiny 
test.91 The Court held that economic and “resource” protectionism, both of 
which would provide preferable treatment to Oregon economic interests, 
could never be valid local interests to satisfy the test.92  
                                                                                                                      
 85. For example, it can be assumed that the Court would not declare “valid” the state 
purpose to discriminate on the basis of race.   
 86. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Envtl. Quality Comm’n, 511 U.S. 93, 100 
(1994). 
 87. Cf. City o� Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). Even bona fide 
goals in the public interest violate the Commerce Clause if the means of achieving them is 
protectionist. The Supreme Court wrote in City of Philadelphia that discriminatory legislation 
was nearly always invalid, “whether the ultimate aim of the legislation was to assure a steady 
supply of milk by erecting barriers to allegedly ruinous outside competition . . . or to create 
jobs by keeping industry within the State . . . or to preserve the State’s financial resources 
from depletion by fencing out indigent immigrants . . . . In each of these cases, a presumably 
legitimate goal was sought to be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State 
from the national economy.” Id. 
 88. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 386.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 392–94.  
 91. Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 108.   
 92. Id. at 107. 
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Prior to 2011, no state had identified global climate change as a legiti-
mate local purpose justifying the use of discriminatory means. There had 
not been the opportunity to do so: few states had serious climate change 
legislation before California passed its climate change law in 2006.93 How-
ever, an analogy to the argument that global climate change might be a 
state’s concern can be found in the landmark Massachusetts v. EPA case. 
There, the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts had standing to chal-
lenge the EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the 
Clean Air Act, as Massachusetts had demonstrated the requisite level of 
injury from global climate change, and had demonstrated that the EPA was 
failing to regulate a significant contributor to that phenomenon—vehicle 
emissions of greenhouse gases.94 For example, since the “rising seas have 
already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land,” and because “the 
Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property, 
. . . it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.”95 
The Court also suggested that the special status Massachusetts held as a 
sovereign imputed to it some of the injury resulting from the effects of 
global climate change on lands in its domain: given “Massachusetts’ stake in 
protecting its quasi-sovereign interests,” the State “is entitled to special 
solicitude” in the standing analysis.96 This holding suggests that states may 
have special interests in the regulation of climate change.  
C. Very Legitimate Interests: Health and Safety Laws 
Some cases have implied that a somewhat higher level of constitutional 
deference must be given to states regulating to protect health and safety, as 
well as other areas of traditional state concern. However, this factor is 
somewhat inconsistently applied. For example, in United Haulers Ass’n v. 
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, the Court wrote that the 
ordinances at issue were “exercises of the police power in an effort to ad-
dress waste disposal, a typical and traditional concern o� local 
government.”97 Therefore, the Court declined the Plaintiffs’ invitation to 
“hold that laws favoring public entities while treating all private businesses 
                                                                                                                      
 93. See, e.g., Peter Henderson, A Threat to California’s Climate Change Progress, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/business/energy-environment/ 
20green.html?_r=0 (explaining that “California is the clear U.S. leader on addressing climate 
change,” and that the “U.S. climate change bill, which passed the House o� Representatives 
but failed in the Senate, was modeled after California’s 2006 law”). 
 94. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521, 523 (2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 95. Id. at 522.  
 96. Id. at 520. 
 97. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 347 (2007).   
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the same are subject to an almost per se rule of invalidity,” implying that 
such rigorous scrutiny of “economic legislation passed under the auspices of 
the police power” was a remnant of the bygone Lochner era of judicial su-
premacy.98 Similarly, the Court affirmed in Maine v. Taylor that “[a]s long 
as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to place 
itself in a position of economic isolation, . . . it retains broad regulatory 
authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of 
its natural resources.”99 Thus, the Court begins these cases in a stance of (at 
least formal) deference to states’ positions of authority to regulate health 
and safety within their borders. 
Despite the Court’s deference to state police power, regulation o� 
health and safety is not a shield against the requirements of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Consistent with the logic of the balancing test, dire 
health concerns may merit harsh restrictions on interstate commerce; for 
example, many quarantine laws have passed muster, especially when they 
were targeted to the specific source of contagion.100 On the other hand, a 
New Jersey statute banning the import of waste into the state was held to 
fail the balancing test, despite the State’s allegations that the law protected 
the public health.101 That law was not analogous to the valid quarantine 
laws, according to the Court, because the “harms caused by waste are said to 
arise after its disposal in landfill sites, and at that point . . . there is no basis 
to distinguish out-of-state waste from domestic waste.”102 The Court found 
that there was an impermissible disconnect between the State’s assertions 
that waste threatened the public health and the State’s chosen remedy, 
which was to ban only out-of-state waste, with no explanation for why only 
that waste threatened health.103 In short, the Court concluded that the law 
must have been a thinly-veiled protectionist measure to attempt to reduce 
the size o� New Jersey’s landfills through the impermissible means of re-
stricting interstate commerce.104 
                                                                                                                      
 98. Id. (referencing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
 99. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 100. See City o� Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628–29 (1978) (“The appel-
lees argue that not all laws which facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce are 
forbidden protectionist regulations. In particular, they point to quarantine laws, which this 
Court has repeatedly upheld even though they appear to single out interstate commerce for 
special treatment . . . . But those quarantine laws banned the importation of articles such as 
diseased livestock that required destruction as soon as possible because their very movement 
risked contagion and other evils. Those laws thus did not discriminate against interstate 
commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin.”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
    104. Id. at 629. 
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Finally, even though state laws regulating health and safety have tradi-
tionally been afforded a measure of deference by the courts, this stance was 
called into question by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authori-
ty.105 In that case, the Supreme Court held that it was not the role of the 
federal judiciary to determine which realms were and were not traditionally 
the zones of state authority for the purposes of the Tenth Amendment, 
which guarantees that all powers not given to Congress remain with the 
states.106 The court overruled the 1976 case National League of Cities v. Usery, 
which had identified the arenas that were traditional state functions that the 
federal government could not permissibly regulate.107 In Garcia, the Court 
held that “the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity 
in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is not only unworkable but is 
also inconsistent with established principles o� federalism and, indeed, with 
those very federalism principles on which National League of Cities purport-
ed to rest.”108 However, the Court decided United Haulers in 1997, over ten 
years after Garcia. United Haulers included some of the strongest language 
suggestive of deference to traditional areas of state concern.109 Therefore, it 
is unclear the extent to which Garcia has changed the stance courts must 
take in weighing state health and safety laws for the purposes of the 
dormant Commerce Clause. 
It is also unclear whether the amount of deference courts grant to a 
state under the Tenth Amendment, as in Garcia, differs from the amount of 
deference due when testing a state law under the dormant Commerce 
Clause. The two provisions both appear in the Constitution, with neither 
taking an obvious position of inferiority to the either. Some scholars and 
Supreme Court Justices have found an affirmative guarantee in the Tenth 
Amendment, suggesting that it grants states certain powers or privileges, 
whereas others regard it only as a passive guarantee sketching out the rela-
tionship between the federal and state governments.110 The dormant 
                                                                                                                      
 105. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.  
 107. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1976).   
 108. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.  
    109. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
 110. Traditionally, it was more common for courts to hold that the Tenth Amendment 
was merely a truism. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“The amendment 
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authority. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
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Commerce Clause seems to mirror the “truism” model of the Tenth 
Amendment: that is, it stands for the proposition that the states cannot do 
what Congress can in relation to commerce. Therefore, the dormant Com-
merce Clause mirrors the “size” of Congress’s Commerce power: a state 
regulation would not implicate the dormant Commerce Clause unless it 
involved a regulation Congress would also be permitted to enact. This 
analysis does not inform how to balance the two Constitutional provisions, 
but it suggests that a State defending its law against a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge should allege that the challenge infringes upon the borders 
of the Tenth Amendment. The State could rely on the idea that the Tenth 
Amendment has some affirmative power, and that the federal government 
should not diminish that authority.  
D. Strict Scrutiny: Reasonable Nondiscriminatory Alternatives 
Finally, once a court has determined that a legitimate local purpose ex-
isted to justify discrimination in the strict scrutiny test, courts consider 
whether non-discriminatory alternatives existed that the State could have 
employed to achieve the desired interest. Since so many strict scrutiny cases 
fail at the first stage, when the court determines that the law is protection-
ist, it is somewhat rare to get a glimpse of what might satisfy a court for the 
purposes of determining whether there were no reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives to the discriminatory legislation. However, in a 
case challenging a municipal ordinance in Madison, Wisconsin that re-
quired all milk from outside the city to be pasteurized within five miles of 
the city, the court described that there were “reasonable and adequate alter-
natives” available to safeguard the quality of milk in Madison.111 For 
example, the Court suggested that the City could charge the milk importers 
“the actual and reasonable cost” of inspection by the City’s own trusted 
officials, rather than insisting on local pasteurization.112  
In Maine v. Taylor, the Supreme Court analyzed a Maine law banning 
the importation o� live baitfish into the state, which was intended to stop 
the spread of invasive species and parasites.113 The Court found that “[n]o 
matter how one describes the abstract issue whether ‘alternative means 
could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against 
interstate commerce,’ . . . the more specific question whether scientifically 
accepted techniques exist for the sampling and inspection o� live baitfish is 
one o� fact.”114 Furthermore, the Court held that the district court’s “finding 
that such techniques have not been devised cannot be characterized as  
                                                                                                                      
 111. Dean Milk Co. v. City o� Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354–55 (1951).  
 112. Id. 
 113. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
 114. Id. at 146 (1986) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)). 
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clearly erroneous,” and that “the record probably could not support a con-
trary finding.”115 This standard does not require the development of new 
technologies that would achieve the ends without discrimination; therefore, 
the Plaintiffs’ assertions that other methods of controlling invasive species 
and parasites might be developed did not mean that Maine could not use the 
means most readily available to it in the present—the banning of importa-
tion.116 
E. The Pike Balancing Test 
In contrast with the virtual per se invalidity of statutes confronting the 
strict scrutiny test, the Pike balancing test tends to be highly deferential. As 
long as three conditions are met, the statute is likely to be upheld.117 Laws 
confronting the Pike standard have already met the first condition—that 
they do not discriminate on their face against interstate commerce, but that 
they only discriminate in their impacts.118 Next, the law must serve a valid, 
empirically demonstrable purpose for the state.119 Finally, the demonstrated 
impacts to interstate commerce must not be badly outweighed by the 
demonstrated burdens the state desires.120  
In 2007, the Supreme Court upheld a New York “flow control” ordi-
nance that required all waste to be processed through a state-owned public 
benefit corporation.121 The Court reasoned that the flow ordinance should 
be subject to the Pike balancing test, rather than strict scrutiny, because all 
businesses, whether in- or out-of-state, were subject to precisely the same 
laws, and therefore the ordinance did not discriminate against interstate 
commerce.122 Employing the balancing test, the Court found that the legit-
imate local interests in creating “a convenient and effective way to finance 
[the affected counties’] integrated package of waste disposal services,” and 
in “increas[ing] recycling” outweighed the discriminatory impacts on inter-
state commerce, which were entirely theoretical: the lower courts had found 
no demonstrated impacts at all.123 
Courts defer to the State’s judgment about what non-protectionist 
goals it wishes to achieve, but a major factor in the balancing test is the 
ability of the State to demonstrate empirically that the effects it is imposing 
                                                                                                                      
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 147. 
 117. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 334 (2007). 
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on interstate commerce are justified in relation to the benefits the State 
desires. Justice Blackmun emphasized that, so long as “safety justifications 
[for a law] are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative 
judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on 
interstate commerce.”124 States often fail, however, to demonstrate that the 
benefits are not illusory, or that they are weighty enough to justify serious 
impacts on interstate commerce.125 Iowa’s ban on trailers sixty-five feet and 
longer, purportedly to avoid the dangers associated with long trailers, was 
held invalid where there was no real evidence showing that sixty-five-foot 
trailers were any less safe than shorter ones, and in fact “[s]tatistical stud-
ies” had showed no safety difference at all.126 Similarly, the Court struck 
down an Arizona law regulating the length of train cars as passing “beyond 
what is plainly essential for safety since it does not appear that [the law] 
will lessen rather than increase the danger of accident.”127 
F. Pike Balancing Test: Legitimate Local Purposes  
Even compelling health justifications do not inoculate a law from 
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny under the more forgiving Pike test. 
The City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey Court stated that “[a]ll objects of 
interstate trade,” including “innately harmful articles,” “merit Commerce 
Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset.”128 Rather 
than setting out a “two-tiered” system of dormant Commerce Clause analy-
sis, wherein certain dangerous objects were excluded from protection 
altogether, earlier cases had held “simply that because the articles’ worth in 
interstate commerce was far outweighed by the dangers inhering in their 
very movement, States could prohibit their transportation across state 
lines.”129 In other words, all articles warrant constitutional protection, even 
those that are “valueless” wastes.130 However, there is a type of cost-benefit 
analysis courts employ: if the articles are worth very little and there are 
strong reasons to regulate them, the court will tip the balance in favor of 
the state’s regulation.131 States can likely pass laws to regulate harmful 
products without unduly interfering with interstate commerce because the 
health stakes are so high. 
                                                                                                                      
 124. Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449 (1978) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring).  
 125. See, e.g., id. at 443. 
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Because of the balancing nature of the Pike test, the burden placed on 
the regulated articles must be “clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits” in order to invalidate the law.132 Therefore, no matter how 
grave the peril the State attempts to regulate, the burden must be far worse. 
For a serious issue such as climate change, it would probably take an ex-
treme burden to warrant overturning a state regulation under the Pike test. 
IV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN FARMERS UNION CHALLENGE 
Alleging that the LCFS violated the dormant Commerce Clause, farm-
ers and farmer and industry groups brought suit in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of California on December 23, 
2009.133 The Plaintiffs sought injunctions against the LCFS, arguing it was 
unconstitutional for three reasons. First, they alleged that it “conflicts with 
and is preempted by federal law, including the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007.”134 Second, they argued that “it interferes with the 
regulation of interstate commerce.”135 Finally, they argued that “it discrimi-
nates against out-of-state corn ethanol producers and importers and 
improperly regulates their extraterritorial conduct.”136 The final two allega-
tions formed their argument that the LCFS violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  
In support of its allegations about the dormant Commerce Clause vio-
lation, the Complaint focused on the way in which the LCFS regulated 
extraterritorially. It pointed out that, “[�]or ethanol produced outside Cali-
fornia, only two parts of the overall lifecycle of the ethanol—transportation 
of the ethanol within California and the combustion of ethanol in a motor 
vehicle in operation—occur inside California.”137 The Complaint also chal-
lenged California’s calculation of the carbon intensity, which took into 
account the “so-called indirect ‘land use or other indirect effect’ from the 
production of corn itself, predominantly in the Midwest, ascribing a penal-
ty to all corn ethanol based on its assumed indirect contribution to 
                                                                                                                      
 132. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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worldwide [greenhouse gas (GHG)] emissions.”138 As a result of this calcu-
lation, the Plaintiffs alleged that the LCFS “penalizes all corn ethanol based 
on the purported indirect effects of assumed farming practices that occur 
predominantly outside California, and through the regulation, California 
seeks to curb or eliminate these farming practices throughout the United 
States and beyond by making the entire corn ethanol market responsible for 
them.”139 The Complaint further alleged that California discriminated 
against ethanol produced outside California, especially that produced in the 
Midwest.140 The Complaint suggested that CARB regulated this way due to 
a “preference” for Brazilian sugarcane ethanol, which scored relatively 
better.141 Finally, the Complaint alleged that the LCFS would economically 
injure Midwestern ethanol producers both by imposing compliance costs on 
them through the cap-and-trade scheme, and by shifting Californian de-
mand for ethanol to Brazilian sugarcane.142 
At the district court, Judge O’Neill found in the Plaintiffs’ favor in De-
cember of 2011.143 He held that the LCFS was subject to strict scrutiny 
review due to its discrimination against out-of-state commerce, because the 
LCFS automatically assigned a higher score to other states’ fuels.144 The 
court further held that, while the LCFS did serve the legitimate local pur-
pose of reducing the risks of global warming, California failed to establish 
that it could not have used other nondiscriminatory means, such as a carbon 
tax or greater vehicle efficiency, to achieve that purpose.145 Accordingly, the 
LCFS violated the dormant Commerce Clause.  
California appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which heard oral arguments 
in October of 2012.146 The Ninth Circuit judges agreed to a temporary 
reinstatement of the LCFS, but appeared to be somewhat unsympathetic to 
California’s arguments that the LCFS did not discriminate against other 
states.147 They issued a ruling on October 16, 2013, discussed below. 
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A. Challenge in the Eastern District of California 
At the District Court for the Eastern District of California, the coali-
tion o� farmers, farming organizations, and corn ethanol industry groups 
suing CARB successfully obtained a preliminary injunction against CARB’s 
LCFS.148 Judge O’Neill agreed with them that the standard unconstitution-
ally regulated interstate commerce, finding that the LCFS facially  
discriminated against interstate commerce. Accordingly, he applied the 
strict scrutiny test.149 While he agreed with California that reducing global 
warming was a legitimate local purpose justifying state action, he found 
that the State could have used other, non-discriminatory alternative 
measures to achieve their desired ends.150   
In this section, I will argue, as the Ninth Circuit later agreed, that 
Judge O’Neill applied the wrong test when he held that the LCFS facially 
discriminated against interstate commerce; instead, the Pike balancing test, 
rather than the strict scrutiny test, is appropriate.151 Next, I will discuss the 
significance of Judge O’Neill’s finding that global warming was a legitimate 
local purpose, and the implications of this finding for future states’ regula-
tory schemes. Finally, I will discuss and critique Judge O’Neill’s finding 
that there were nondiscriminatory alternatives California could have used.  
The Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, filed 
on December 23, 2009, alleged two violations o� law. First, it alleged that 
the LCFS was preempted by federal law, including the Energy Independ-
ence and Security Act (EISA).152 Second, relevant here, the complaint 
alleged that the LCFS violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discrim-
inating impermissibly against Midwestern corn ethanol producers.153 
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Perhaps to underscore the irrationality of CARB’s chosen tool of regulation, 
the Plaintiffs emphasized that corn ethanol reduces greenhouse gas emis-
sions relative to traditional liquid fuels.154  
The Plaintiffs failed to obtain summary judgment on the federal 
preemption issue, as the court ruled they lacked standing.155 However, they 
persuaded the court to grant them summary judgment on the dormant 
Commerce Clause issues.156 Judge O’Neill issued a preliminary injunction 
against CARB, finding that the LCFS impermissibly discriminated against 
interstate commerce.157  
1. The Choice o� Test 
The first step in the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, both in the 
pleadings and in Judge O’Neill’s opinion, was to identify which dormant 
Commerce Clause test was appropriate for the analysis of the LCFS. Given 
that Maine v. Taylor stands as the only example of a state law upheld under 
the strict scrutiny test, neither party could fail to appreciate the vital im-
portance of the choice of test. In the Equal Protection context, a similarly 
demanding test has been called “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”158 That is, 
since so few laws survive this level o� heightened scrutiny, the choice of test 
may be the most important part of the analysis.  
In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs argued that LCFS was appropriately 
considered under a strict scrutiny test because it discriminated against 
interstate commerce in effect, if not in purpose.159 One way the Plaintiffs 
attempted to demonstrate the appropriateness of the strict scrutiny test was 
by demonstrating that the LCFS regulated extraterritorial conduct. The 
Complaint alleged that, for “ethanol produced outside California, only two 
parts of the overall lifecycle of the ethanol—transportation of the ethanol 
within California and the combustion of ethanol in a motor vehicle in oper-
ation—occur inside California.”160 However, the LCFS lookup table took 
into account all stages of the ethanol production in order to assign a carbon 
intensity score. For example, CARB “purported to gauge the so-called 
indirect ‘land use or other indirect effect’ from the production of corn itself, 
predominately in the Midwest, ascribing a penalty to all corn ethanol based 
on its assumed indirect contribution to worldwide GHG emissions” be-
cause CARB believed that, “by participating in the market for certain 
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biofuels, regulated parties incentivize other, non-regulated parties all over 
the world to turn non-agricultural land into agricultural land; that land-use 
change by third parties supposedly releases GHG emissions, which CARB 
in turn attributes to the use o� biofuels in this country.”161 In other words, 
California was regulating conduct occurring purely outside its borders when 
it considered, for example, the way in which the corn was grown in the 
Midwest, and the ripple effects of agricultural land use.  
The Complaint also argued that the LCFS merited the strict scrutiny 
test because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce by draw-
ing geographical distinctions. The LCFS allegedly “draws significant 
distinctions among different producers of U.S. corn ethanol, depending on 
whether the ethanol is produced in California or outside California.”162 As 
evidence, the Complaint emphasized that “for at least four corn ethanol fuel 
pathways, the ‘look-up table’ assigns a higher total carbon intensity value to 
corn ethanol originating in the Midwest than to identical corn ethanol 
originating in California, based on factors almost entirely beyond any single 
producer’s control.”163 The Plaintiffs acknowledged that some of this dis-
crepancy was due to “the carbon emitted during the interstate 
transportation of their ethanol.”164 Indeed, the Plaintiffs went on to insist 
that any distinctions made on the basis of transportation would discrimi-
nate: “Tying carbon intensity scores to the distance a good travels in 
interstate commerce discriminates against interstate commerce,” they stated 
plainly.165  
Finally, the Plaintiffs emphasized that, in order to maintain their com-
petitiveness in California, the already-embattled Midwestern corn ethanol 
producers would effectively be forced to either change their behavior to suit 
CARB’s whims or to purchase cap-and-trade credits on the California mar-
ket.166 Regulated parties, according to the Plaintiffs, could only generate 
credits “if the state approves o� how that party produces, ships, delivers, 
and distributes its product, beginning at the location(s) where some com-
ponents are produced, be they in-state or out-of-state, and ending in 
California.”167 This suggestion demonstrated California’s extraterritorial 
regulation. If true, it suggested that the State is forcing out-of-state pro-
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ducers either to change their behavior in specific ways, or to undertake new 
costs.  
California responded to these allegations with a vociferous defense of 
its position, arguing that it was not discriminating against interstate com-
merce. First, California argued that it could not be discriminating because 
it was not treating similarly situated entities differently. In other words, 
California argued that the LCFS was facially neutral, and it was not Cali-
fornia’s fault that the Midwestern producers happened to have more of the 
qualities—high carbon intensity—that California was regulating.168 “Under 
the LCFS,” explained California, “all ethanols are regulated in the same 
manner,” and the standard “has no . . . on/off switch” responding to in- and 
out-of-state ethanols differently.169  
In defense of its use of transportation distance as a factor in assigning 
carbon intensity, California noted that the measure was not the dispositive 
factor in the carbon intensity value assigned. California pointed out that, as 
originally promulgated, there was “no correlation between in-state status 
and lowest CI values or out-of-state status and highest CI values.”170 Since 
then, with CARB’s option for entities to request an individualized CI value, 
Midwestern producers’ averages were still in the same range as California 
producers (if a little higher on average), and there were “five Midwest 
ethanol pathways with lower CI values than the value for which California 
plants have registered.”171 In sum, California argued, the LCFS was not 
discriminatory “both because it distinguishes among fuels based on carbon 
intensity, rather than origin, and because it provides the flexibility for low 
carbon fuel producers to apply for a lower, individualized CI value, regard-
less of the location of their facility.”172 
Finally, California argued that, even taking the transportation into ac-
count, there was no discriminatory purpose against Midwestern ethanol, 
and no discriminatory effect. It pointed out that “inclusion of emissions 
from transportation provides a net advantage to Midwest corn ethanol 
plants compared to California corn ethanol plants, because of the inclusion 
of the emissions for transporting the corn (which is grown in the Mid-
west).”173 Overall, it argued, there was “no relative ‘penalty’ to Midwest 
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producers based on their distance from California.”174 For all of these rea-
sons, California argued that “the true purposes of the LCFS . . . are the 
antithesis of protectionism,” because a primary goal of the standard was to 
“encourage the development and commercialization o� lower carbon fuels, 
which will diversify the market, not contract it.”175 
In his opinion, Judge O’Neill agreed with the Plaintiffs that strict scru-
tiny analysis was appropriate. He cited Plaintiffs’ contentions that CARB 
had assigned Midwestern sources a roughly 10 percent higher CI score than 
their California counterparts, and he found that the “LCFS and Table 6 [of 
the LCFS] explicitly differentiate among ethanol pathways based on origin 
(Midwest vs. California) and activities inextricably intertwined with origin 
(electricity provided by Midwest power companies vs. California power 
suppliers and interstate transportation).”176 He found that this explicit 
differentiation, leading to “higher CI scores based on, inter alia, the location 
of the production facility and the distance the product travels . . . discrimi-
nates against out-of-state corn-derived ethanol on its face.”177 Due to this 
facial discrimination, he applied the strict scrutiny test.  
Judge O’Neill dismissed California’s arguments that the higher CI 
scores were based on permissible scientific, non-discriminatory bases. De-
spite the State’s assertions, Judge O’Neill found that the total regime 
“assign[ed] favorable assumptions to California while penalizing out-of-
state competitors,” “treat[ed] electricity generate [sic] outside of the state 
differently than electricity generated inside its border,” and tied judgments 
to miles traveled—all of which were factors that discriminated against 
interstate commerce.178 His judgment was ultimately grounded in the “ef-
fects” prong of the strict scrutiny test—while he acknowledged that the 
LCFS was not discriminatory in its purpose, it nevertheless discriminated 
on its face through its effects in interstate commerce. That is, since the 
LCFS could have the effect of raising the price o� Midwestern ethanol 
relative to California ethanol, it impermissibly affected the interstate mar-
ket.179  
The choice of the strict scrutiny test is problematic for several reasons. 
First, it was almost conceded, even by the Plaintiffs, that there was no 
protectionist motive in the LCFS—a motive that is often invoked as a 
rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause’s uncompromising stance in 
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these cases.180 The Supreme Court strikes down state laws that appear to 
have a protectionist effect, even without determining whether protection-
ism truly was a motivation of the legislature.181 A prime example of this is 
in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, in which the Court 
noted skeptically the protectionist effects of an apple labeling law purport-
ing to protect consumers, but not rationally advancing that interest.182 
Here, on the other hand, even the Plaintiffs acknowledged that California 
did not stand to benefit from its look-up tables. For example, they alleged 
in the Complaint that the LCFS tended to assign more favorable scores to 
sugar cane, grown largely in Brazil and elsewhere overseas, than to even 
Californian ethanol.183 This favorable result for Brazilian producers, argued 
the Plaintiffs, would effectively “require regulated entities producing gaso-
line for sale in California quickly to try to obtain ethanol produced in 
Brazil, not the United States,” injuring in the process “the business of all 
corn ethanol biorefineries in the United States, including those located in 
California.”184 Moreover, neither the Plaintiffs nor Judge O’Neill suggested 
there was anything other than a (perhaps misguided) desire to cure the ills 
of global warming motivating California’s adoption of the LCFS. Since the 
“purpose of the Commerce Clause is to prohibit outright economic protec-
tionism or regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic actors 
by burdening out-of-state actors,” and that the dormant Commerce Clause 
works to “ferret out this illicit motive,” it is inapposite to employ the strict 
scrutiny test, in all its rigor, in a case empty of evidence of protectionism.185  
Ultimately, as Judge O’Neill conceded,186 this case presented a different 
angle on the dormant Commerce Clause than is typical of those cases. Not 
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only did the LCFS not serve a protectionist motive for California; it also 
failed to discriminate in an orderly way. As both parties pointed out, Brazil-
ian sugarcane producers scored better on the whole than other parties did, 
and some Midwestern producers scored better than some California pro-
ducers. The general spread of the CI values points to the truth of CARB’s 
assertions that it was merely trying to sensibly order fuels based on their 
carbon intensity for scientific purposes, rather than advancing a secret 
motive to promote California’s economy. 
Given these considerations, the only way in which the strict scrutiny 
test was applicable to the LCFS was through the “effects” test—the law 
facially discriminated in its effects—but not simply in its application. As 
Judge O’Neill wrote, a law “is facially discriminatory when it ‘is not neces-
sary to look beyond the text of this statute to determine that it 
discriminates against interstate commerce.’ ”187 He continued to explain 
that “ ‘discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and 
out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the 
latter.”188 According to the case law Judge O’Neill consulted, then, a law 
would need to treat in- and out-of-state interests differently in its text, and 
that differential treatment would need to be grounded in protectionism. 
The effects test is not met by simply demonstrating that a law has effects in 
interstate commerce at all—if this were the case, the Pike balancing test 
would not exist. To merit strict scrutiny review, a law must discriminate in 
effect on its face by treating out-of-state entities differently than in-state 
ones. Moreover, in-state actors must also benefit from the legislation.189 It 
is hard to conclude that the LCFS met this standard.  
Even conceding that the look-up tables, on the whole, demonstrated a 
“boost” in CI scores for Midwestern ethanol on average, that does not 
merit the conclusion that Californian interests benefited from imposing 
burdens on out-of-state interests. As all parties conceded, California did 
not stand to benefit significantly from the LCFS. Moreover, the only as-
pect of the law that is susceptible to this interpretation is Table 6, which 
demonstrates an inconsistent and slight disadvantage for Midwestern inter-
ests. Finally, the burden it imposes on Midwestern interests is still 
somewhat speculative:190 the harm the Plaintiffs alleged was a potential 
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increase in prices Midwestern producers would have to pass on to consum-
ers because they, on average, would have higher compliance costs than 
groups with, on average, lower CI scores. This speculative, slight, and in-
consistent burden on out-of-state parties does not rise to the level of 
dormant Commerce Clause cases, and it is hard to understand how the 
rationale of the exacting strict scrutiny test is served in this case. This is 
especially true taking into account CARB’s attempts to make the LCFS 
responsive to individual requests for CI  
adjustments, and the agency’s scientific and economic justifications for the 
mechanisms of the Table.  
Given Judge O’Neill’s analysis, it is possible that no regime serving the 
LCFS’s avowed goals could survive strict scrutiny. That is, a regime like the 
LCFS would apparently have to ignore the impact of transportation dis-
tance on CI, which would reduce the accuracy and efficacy of the standard. 
This is especially true if the scheme would have to cease to consider all of 
the variables that led CARB to conclude that Midwestern ethanol was, on 
average, higher in CI than some other sources. For example, if CARB could 
not make any conclusions based on factual regional differences (such as the 
ways in which the corn was grown), the CI results would not reflect reality 
and would not allow the State to make a meaningful carbon-reduction 
effort. The dormant Commerce Clause frequently does foreclose states 
from pursuing projects, so the fact that this analysis might stymie Califor-
nia’s wishes does not mean the analysis is wrong. However, the serious 
practical difficulties of complying with Judge O’Neill’s interpretation of the 
constitutional mandates, when combined with the tenuous match between 
typical strict scrutiny analysis and the LCFS, make the application of this 
test a surprising result.  
A different result might be mandated in the case if the LCFS consid-
ered the precise number of miles traveled by a transportation fuel, whether 
within or without California. Table 6’s averages currently provide one 
transportation input for CI; all Californian producers are subject to the 
same average transportation value of 8.1gCO2e/MJ, regardless of where 
they are located within the state.191 However, there would likely be an un-
reasonably high burden placed on CARB if it had to calculate the precise 
number of miles traveled to the ultimate point of sale. Such a regime would 
disable CARB from administering categories of CI at all—it would effec-
tively have to perform an individual CI analysis for each batch of vehicle 
fuel. However, conceptually such a program might satisfy Judge O’Neill, if 
not the Plaintiffs, that transportation was no longer a factor used to dis-
criminate against interstate commerce. The use of transportation miles to 
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increase the CI of out-of-state fuels, but not in-state fuels, is the best argu-
ment that that factor was uniquely discriminatory to out-of-state interests.  
Finally, in a close case such as this one, the State might argue that 
courts should defer to its judgment—at least to the limited extent that a 
court might err on the side of applying the more forgiving Pike balancing 
test as opposed to the strict scrutiny test when there are strong arguments 
for both tests. In other words, due to the general principles of state sover-
eignty and federalism enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, it might be 
appropriate to add a new rule to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine: 
that when a statute does not clearly discriminate on its face, that a court 
should apply the Pike test. In this case, Judge O’Neill appears to have done 
the opposite: facing a strong argument from both sides at the test selection 
step, he chose to apply the “fatal in fact” strict scrutiny test. This approach 
raises concerns about states’ autonomy.  
2. Legitimate Local Purpose 
Rocky Mountain is momentous in that it appears to be the first case in 
which a state asserted that global warming was a legitimate local purpose 
for the purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. As such, the analysis of 
this prong of the strict scrutiny test may set the foundations for future state 
challenges, should other states adopt controversial measures such as A.B. 
32. Despite the high stakes in this question, and despite Judge O’Neill’s 
generally unfavorable outcomes regarding the LCFS, his holding briefly 
and decisively stated that global warming was a legitimate purpose. This 
decision and its reasoning may have come as a surprise to both parties. The 
Ninth Circuit did not disturb the lower court’s ruling in its analysis.192  
The Plaintiffs leaned heavily on the relative sizes of the immense glob-
al warming problem and the modest LCFS to demonstrate that California’s 
regulatory scheme did not serve a legitimate local purpose. First, they 
argued that “GHG emissions mix into the atmosphere so thoroughly that 
their only effects are worldwide,” such that “the immediate locality from 
which the GHG is emitted is affected no more or no less than the entire 
world.”193 In other words, no locality would be able to assert global warming 
as a legitimate local purpose, since the problem was inherently global, and 
“a ton of GHG emitted in India or China has the same effect on GHGs in 
California as a ton of GHGs emitted in California or Iowa.”194 If this were 
truly the case, the Plaintiffs would have foreclosed all potential state regula-
tion of global warming, since no locality could assert an injury greater than 
any other state’s or locality’s injury from GHG emissions. 
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Second, the Plaintiffs agued that global warming could not serve as a 
legitimate local purpose because California was the only state to attempt to 
regulate in this way, resulting in negligible or even zero net change in GHG 
emissions. They alleged that the LCFS would simply incentivize producers 
to shuffle their existing fuels: they would “ ‘ship lower-carbon-intensity 
fuels’ to California, ‘while shipping higher-carbon-intensity fuels else-
where.’ ”195 Producers would thereby comply with the LCFS by rearranging 
their shipments, and no net carbon decrease would occur. In other words, 
the Plaintiffs asserted that no single state could achieve GHG reductions by 
capping the amount of carbon intensity of its fuels without exporting a 
similar regulatory scheme elsewhere to truly constrain the behavior of in-
dustry. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs essentially argued that since California admitted-
ly could not make a significant impact on global warming through the 
LCFS alone, that global warming could not be a legitimate local purpose. 
They quoted CARB in their complaint as having acknowledged that 
“ ‘GHG emission reductions by the LCFS alone will not result in signifi-
cant climate change,’ ” and that “ ‘[i]t is unlikely that the LCFS alone will 
result in any measurable climate change and reduction of global warm-
ing.’ ”196 This set of admissions by CARB factored into the Plaintiffs’ overall 
assertion that “there are virtually no local benefits to the LCFS regula-
tion.”197 In other words, global warming could not be a legitimate local 
purpose if California stood to gain nothing from the regulatory tool it had 
chosen to attack the problem.  
California argued that global warming could be a local interest, if not 
because the regulated GHGs truly affected California specially, but simply 
because a global reduction in total GHG amount would work benefits in 
California. The State cited the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
which decided that Massachusetts had standing to pursue a claim against 
the EPA for failing to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act.198 In its 
brief, the State confidently quoted the court: the fact that the “climate-
change risks are ‘widely-shared’ does not minimize [California’s] interest in 
reducing them.”199 From this, the State concluded briefly that “California’s 
purpose [in the LCFS] is both legitimate and local.”200  
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A significant problem that California failed to address in its brief is 
that the Court did not discuss California’s interest in global warming in the 
Massachusetts case. Instead, where California inserted its name, it simply 
replaced “Massachusetts.”201 Had the Court written that the widespread 
impacts of climate change do not reduce any state’s interest in them, Cali-
fornia’s move would appear less daring. But the State put forward neither 
factual nor legal arguments as to why Massachusetts’s interest for standing 
purposes was identical to and applicable to California’s interest for Com-
merce Clause purposes. This is of concern because of the legal differences 
between these two cases and the factual background relied on by the Court 
in Massachusetts v. EPA to justify why Massachusetts had an interest in 
global warming, discussed infra. 
California proceeded to rebut the Plaintiffs’ arguments that regulated 
entities’ opportunistic “resource shuffling” would eliminate any net carbon 
reductions. First, it argued that plants selling fuel both in and outside of 
California would have incentives to produce lower-carbon fuel overall, 
rather than exclusively selling lower-carbon fuels in-state and continuing 
business as usual for other target states—for example, it would be more 
efficient to produce all fuel the same way, rather than maintaining separate 
product lines merely to keep non-California-bound fuels higher in CI.202 
Furthermore, the State argued that the LCFS complemented the EPA’s 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2), “providing additional incentives for 
incremental reductions in emissions within RFS2 categories o� fuels.”203 
In his opinion, Judge O’Neill agreed with California that Massachusetts 
v. EPA meant global warming was a legitimate local purpose for Califor-
nia.204 He wrote that “Defendants’ [sic] correctly point out that in 
Massachusetts v. EPA . . . the Supreme Court recognized that a state has a 
‘well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory’ from the threats of 
rising seas and other impacts of global warming.”205 He, too, quoted the 
passage CARB had relied on: “ ‘That these climate-change risks are ‘widely-
shared’ does not minimize [California’s] interest’ in reducing them.”206 
Most notably, Judge O’Neill followed California’s lead and substituted 
“California” for “Massachusetts” in the quote without comment about the 
factual distinctions, if any, between those two states.207 Finally, he disposed 
of the issue whether the standing inquiry in Massachusetts v. EPA differed 
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meaningfully from the LCFS case by remarking that the Supreme Court 
“explained in dicta that a state has a local and legitimate interest in reduc-
ing global warming,” which satisfied him that global warming served a 
legitimate local purpose.208 He offered no citations or further commentary 
on what dicta established that principle, and for what purposes it is legiti-
mate.  
The first important issue, unresolved by the opinion, is by what reason-
ing California has a legitimate local purpose in global warming. On the text 
of the opinion, Judge O’Neill seems to justify this result based on his read-
ing of Massachusetts v. EPA as a blanket statement that all states have a 
legitimate local purpose in global climate change. However, this interpreta-
tion implicitly chooses one potential justification for the holding that  
Massachusetts had an interest in climate change, and ignores another strong 
one.  
The rationale from Massachusetts v. EPA that Judge O’Neill appears to 
follow, borrowing from California’s brief,209 is that a state has a special 
status as sovereign to regulate affairs in its territory. The Massachusetts v. 
EPA Court wrote in dicta that “States are not normal litigants for the pur-
poses of invoking federal jurisdiction.”210 The Court cited a century-old 
case in which the Supreme Court held that Georgia “has an interest inde-
pendent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air 
within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be 
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”211 The 
Court reasoned that “[j]ust as Georgia’s independent interest ‘in all the 
earth and air within its domain’ supported federal jurisdiction a century 
ago, so too does Massachusetts’ [sic] well-founded desire to preserve its 
sovereign territory today.”212 It concluded that, given these considerations, 
Massachusetts was entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analy-
sis.213  
The second justification for Massachusetts’s interest in global warming, 
according to the Supreme Court, stemmed from its position as coastal 
landowner. Since the risks of global warming threatened to erode and swal-
low some o� Massachusetts’s coastline, the State had more traditional 
standing as a landowner to contest acts and omissions that might take its 
property. The Court noted that the rising sea levels “have already begun to 
swallow Massachusetts’ [sic] coastal land,” and that the State, as the owner 
of “a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property,” had alleged “a par-
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ticularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.”214 The injury to the State 
as a landowner would continue to increase with predicted global climate 
change.215 Finally, the State would incur significant remediation costs due 
to these injuries.216  
Given this analysis, it is possible to explain Massachusetts’ interest in 
global warming in three ways: it derives either from its sovereignty, or from 
its coastal land ownership, or both. Judge O’Neill described the sovereignty 
reasoning as “dicta” establishing “that a state has a local and legitimate 
interest in reducing global warming.”217 He did not address the land owner-
ship prong, so, based on his holding, it may be either an alternative basis for 
establishing a local interest in climate change, or an optional extra factor.  
The second important consideration in this analysis is to what extent 
the standard for standing, discussed in Massachusetts v. EPA, applies to the 
dormant Commerce Clause issue o� legitimate local purpose. The Supreme 
Court established that Massachusetts was owed “special solicitude” in the 
standing analysis, largely due to its status as a sovereign.218 This does not 
suggest that the State might be owed special solicitude in all analyses, how-
ever. In other words, the Court’s “sovereign” rationale for Massachusetts’ 
interest in global warming may not reach other legal questions. Critically 
here, the “sovereign” analysis may not be relevant to Commerce Clause 
questions. This is especially likely given that the underlying rationale of the 
dormant Commerce Clause is to restrain the activities of states, not to offer 
them “special solicitude.” Given these considerations, it is troubling if Cali-
fornia and Judge O’Neill rested their analysis of California’s local interest 
simply on its status as a state and by substituting the name of California for 
that o� Massachusetts in the Supreme Court’s reasoning, since that reason-
ing does not reach the Commerce Clause by its terms, and does not serve 
the same interests.  
Despite the questions remaining about this analysis, if it is upheld it 
creates a valuable precedent for states wishing to regulate global warming. 
It adopts an expansive reading of Massachusetts v. EPA, suggesting that for 
any legal test requiring a state to assert an interest in global warming, any 
state has such an interest. The State does not appear to need to allege any 
further facts to benefit from this analysis. For example, under the “land 
ownership” rationale that Judge O’Neill did not use, a state wishing to 
assert a local interest in climate change would have to demonstrate that it 
owns land or other interests that would suffer harm because of the specific 
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predicted effects of global warming. For some states, like California, this 
burden is not likely to be very difficult: California owns substantial por-
tions of its coastline, which suggests that it would have a similar argument 
as Massachusetts had that it would be injured as a land owner due to rising 
sea levels.219 However, landlocked states, such as Iowa, could not assert 
similar injuries; they might have to develop other arguments for how they 
would be injured as land-owners due to other predicted local effects of 
climate change. For example, states might be able to allege that predicted 
droughts and other weather phenomena tied to climate change would dam-
age their natural resources. This would involve a good deal o� factual 
analysis, and would present a more challenging burden in such cases.  
Finally, another positive development arising out of this opinion, from 
the point of view of states wishing to regulate climate change, is the lack of 
importance of redressability. Judge O’Neill declined even to address the 
Plaintiffs’ arguments that climate change could not be a legitimate local 
purpose because the state could not alter its outcome. In the standing con-
text, as in Massachusetts v. EPA, a plaintif�’s injury must be redressable to 
establish standing: plaintiffs must demonstrate that, even if the court ruled 
in their favor, the result would have some impact on their injury.220 This 
prong, too, would be challenging for a state to prove: California would 
almost certainly fail to demonstrate that the reductions in CI from the 
LCFS (10 percent by 2020) would result in less global climate change over-
all.221 Redressability has never been an explicit factor in evaluating a 
legitimate local purpose, however; courts have not analyzed this question.222 
The term “local interest” implies that the locality has some interest in the 
outcome, but not necessarily that the locality can alter the outcome. Moreo-
ver, the analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA offers some relief to parties 
attempting to assert a local interest in climate change: the court wrote that 
“[a] reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emis-
sions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.”223 That is, even if 
emissions continue to rise globally, the fact that a state makes even the 
smallest reduction still reduces the emissions relative to what would have 
been current emissions had the state not acted.  
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3. Extraterritoriality 
As an alternative argument, the Plaintiffs alleged that the LCFS regu-
lated extraterritoriality. If true, this would require a court to employ the 
strict scrutiny test. Therefore, if the LCFS either discriminated or regulat-
ed extraterritorially, the strict scrutiny test would be appropriate. These two 
ways of getting to strict scrutiny are often muddled, however, and some 
courts refuse to employ extraterritoriality at all. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs 
strongly alleged that it applied here.  
The Plaintiffs argued that the LCFS should receive strict scrutiny be-
cause, “[i]n actuality and in practical effect, [it] regulates conduct and 
commerce occurring wholly outside of California.”224 Tied in with this 
argument o� factual extraterritorial regulation, the Plaintiffs consistently 
emphasized that the “purpose of assigning carbon intensity values to fuels 
used in California is to change behavior occurring completely outside the 
state.”225 They insisted that the State was regulating “how out-of-state corn 
ethanol producers and importers” behave by “encouraging regulated parties 
to minimize the assumed carbon emissions throughout the putative lifecycle 
of a fuel,” since the LCFS took into consideration purely Midwestern 
“farming, crop yields, harvesting practices, crop collection and transporta-
tion, fuel used in production, and energy efficiency of production” as well 
as the distance the product traveled.226 Worse, the scheme took “indirect 
land use” into account, which the Plaintiffs cast as the “breathtaking extra-
territoriality” of the LCFS.227 In sum, the Plaintiffs argued, “the LCFS 
unconstitutionally projects California state policy outside its borders.”228 
The State argued that the LCFS did not violate any of the three extra-
territoriality principles it argued were important: it did not regulate 
behavior occurring wholly outside the State; it did not threaten economic 
Balkanization; and it did not only regulate interstate commerce (leaving 
California-only commerce alone).229 By breaking up the inquiry in this way, 
the State could “divide and conquer,” attempting to defuse the Plaintiffs’ 
arguments that extraterritorial effects alone satisfied this test. First, it 
insisted that the LCFS was not regulation of out-of-state behavior, but in-
stead it was simply treating that behavior differently once its products 
arrived in California.230 That is, creating a market-based system with values 
was not regulation of what occurred in the Midwest: if the fuel producers 
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complied with California’s regulations, it would be “to compete for business 
in California, not because there is any legal requirement” to do so.231 Cali-
fornia emphasized that its regulations imposed no requirements on fuels 
not sold in California.232 Next, it argued that the LCFS did not cause eco-
nomic Balkanization because it imposed no “transportation penalty and no 
trade barriers,” and it did not regulate the channels of interstate com-
merce.233 Here again, the State distinguished its market tool from a 
regulation: while transportation was a factor in the LCFS’s calculations, the 
regulations did not impose trade barriers. Producers could import into 
California as much as they liked. 
Judge O’Neill agreed with the Plaintiffs.234 In holding that the LCFS 
controlled extraterritorial conduct, he created an alternative basis for his use 
of the strict scrutiny test. His rationale centered on the Plaintiffs’ argu-
ments about practical effects: “Defendants cannot dispute that the ‘practical 
effect’ of the regulation would be to control” the farming practices and 
other factors occurring in the Midwest that were conducive to higher CI 
scores.235 He also enlisted some of the Plaintiffs’ “purpose” rationale, re-
minding California that its regulations situated it as the primary regulator 
of the GHG intensity o� Midwestern corn ethanol production.236 Finally, 
he found that California’s detailed regulations requiring producers to get 
California’s approval before changing their transportation method amount-
ed to “ ‘forc[ing] a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before 
undertaking a transaction in another,’ causing the LCFS to ‘directly regu-
late[] interstate commerce.’ ”237 
As elsewhere, this question raises conceptual difficulties. California is 
undoubtedly correct that the LCFS does not directly regulate extraterrito-
rial conduct; it only touches those fuels that actually enter California. More 
importantly, the LCFS does not regulate or restrict at all—it merely pro-
vides a framework for a market-based program. At no point would any fuel 
be restricted from entry; it may simply be much more expensive to im-
port.238 By this same token, the Plaintiffs and Judge O’Neill are also correct 
that the LCFS must have the effect of altering behavior outside California’s 
borders. At the very least, the LCFS is intended to have the effect of reduc-
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ing the amount of GHG emissions associated with the fuels it imports, 
which would mean either that the imported fuels are produced differently 
over time (and California’s regulations effected a change in farming or other 
production methods elsewhere), or that outside parties would make a dif-
ferent decision about which fuels to make available in California. In either 
event, some different choice would be made outside California’s borders 
due to the regulatory scheme within the state. If this is enough to qualify as 
extraterritorial regulation, then perhaps the result is correct.  
In his Extraterritoriality section, Judge O’Neill draws in language about 
“practical effects,” which is another, separate way for a state to discriminate 
and be subject to the strict scrutiny test.239 His concluded that California 
“cannot dispute that the ‘practical effect’ of [the LCFS] would be to con-
trol” the land use practices in the Midwest and Brazil that resulted in 
higher carbon emissions.240 He did not hold, however, that the LCFS dis-
criminated against interstate commerce in practical effect; his application of 
the strict scrutiny test was instead based on his holdings that the LCFS 
discriminated facially and regulated extraterritorially.241 
Ultimately, however, Judge O’Neill’s conception of extraterritoriality 
and discriminatory effects cuts too broadly. If every state regulation that 
has some impact on interstate markets is deemed to be extraterritorial or to 
have discriminatory effects, then states’ abilities to operate without impli-
cating the Commerce Clause is decidedly constricted. The LCFS is best 
thought of as an information-gathering mechanism; it places no restrictions 
on products or actors, and it operates blindly with respect to in-state and 
out-of-state parties (i.e., the same regime applies within and without). It is 
true that there are necessarily impacts outside of California, but the other 
tests—discrimination and the Pike balancing test—exist to smoke out this 
type of issue. Therefore, extraterritoriality and practical effects are both too 
broad if they encompass this situation. As the Ninth Circuit found,242 ex-
traterritoriality is not a good fit for understanding the LCFS. It remains to 
be seen whether the district court will, on remand, find that the LCFS 
discriminates against interstate commerce in practical effect.  
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4. Alternatives 
In the strict scrutiny test, once a legitimate local purpose has been 
identified, the final step is to determine whether there were any non-
discriminatory alternatives the State could have used to achieve that inter-
est without impacting interstate commerce.243 As the Plaintiffs argued that 
no legitimate local purpose was present, they put forth no arguments about 
alternatives in their briefs.244 However, the State and the court did continue 
to this step after agreeing that global warming was a legitimate local pur-
pose. Here, however, they disagreed.  
The State argued to the district court that there were no alternatives 
that would allow California to reduce its carbon footprint. It emphasized 
that “a lifecycle analysis is the only effective way to regulate emissions from 
transportation fuels.”245 According to the State, any other method would 
“miss critical contributors to the lifecycle and may result in greater, rather 
than lower, emissions overall,” making AB 32’s desired 10 percent reduction 
in emissions “impossible to achieve.”246  
Judge O’Neill disagreed. He found that because California could have 
reduced its carbon footprint through other schemes, specifically a carbon 
tax, it had alternatives.247 Like his finding that global warming was a legit-
imate local purpose, Judge O’Neill spent relatively little time on this 
section o� his analysis. He emphasized that it was California’s burden to 
demonstrate that there were no “other nondiscriminatory means” to achieve 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.248 He found that California had 
failed to do so, but that affidavits presented by the Plaintiffs had suggested 
a few. These included adopting “an LCFS that does not contain the dis-
criminatory components”; “a tax on fossil fuels”; and “regulating only 
tailpipe GHG emissions in California.”249 The court noted that California 
“speculate[d] that [tailpipe GHG emissions regulation only] may result in 
greater . . . emissions overall, though CARB stated that GHG emissions 
could be reduced by increasing vehicle efficiency or reducing the number of 
vehicle miles traveled.”250 Judge O’Neill conceded that “these approaches 
may be less desirable, for a number of reasons,” but that concession did not 
alter the fact that California had “failed to establish there are no nondis-
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criminatory means by which California could serve its purpose of combat-
ing global warming through the reduction of GHG emissions.”251  
One question arising from Judge O’Neill’s analysis of alternatives is the 
burden of proof. Some of the only helpful discussions on this step of the 
strict scrutiny test comes from Maine v. Taylor, in which the Supreme Court 
deferred to the district court’s finding that Maine had no alternatives but to 
ban the importation o� baitfish to control invasive species.252 There, the 
Court looked for “scientifically accepted techniques” to accomplish the valid 
state goals.253 Therefore, the necessities of science do play a role here; Cali-
fornia is owed deference in its assertions about the requisites for creating a 
functional system. Judge O’Neill’s analysis implies that a regime that ad-
dresses the legitimate local purpose, whether or not it does so well, suffices 
as a reasonable alternative. A question that remains largely unanswered in 
the case law is how similar an alternative must be in order for it to be a 
legitimate alternative, and who bears the burden of demonstrating its suita-
bility. The Maine v. Taylor Court offers little guidance, except that a district 
court’s finding of no alternatives should receive some deference. It does not 
provide a standard for when a district court’s finding that alternatives did 
exist should be overturned.  
Since the district court’s findings o� fact are the jumping-off point for 
the future analysis in the Maine v. Taylor framework, Judge O’Neill’s find-
ing that a carbon tax was an alternative is very important. With the carbon 
tax as the alternative California must compare the LCFS to, there are addi-
tional problems: the carbon tax would either be discriminatory in exactly 
the same way as the LCFS,254 or else would be equally as ineffective as the 
LCFS would be without the location-based CI factors. That is, if California 
enacted a pure carbon tax on the amount of GHGs emitted by the burning 
of various fuels, the tax would not capture the extraneous GHG emissions 
associated with the production of the fuels.255 This is, of course, the precise 
problem the LCFS sought to remedy in the cap-and-trade scheme: it could 
have based its cap-and-trade regime on the pure chemical properties of the 
fuels, but it elected to include the other factors in the CI score for accura-
cy’s sake and to prevent leakage.256 The carbon tax context is no different in 
this regard; no matter how California chooses to raise the cost of emitting 
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GHGs, it must capture all sources of GHG emissions related to a fuel in 
order to do so accurately. No one disputes that these factors include, for 
example, distance transported and land use.  
The above criticism of the carbon tax approach demonstrates the im-
portance of the uncertainty regarding alternatives: after Maine v. Taylor, it 
is unclear how good an alternative must be in order for it to be considered 
an alternative. Here, the alternative appears no better than the existing law: 
both violate the dormant Commerce Clause, under Judge O’Neill’s reason-
ing, if they accurately capture all GHG emissions related to a fuel. If the 
only alternative that might serve the same purposes for a legitimate state 
interest is also discriminatory against interstate commerce, this creates a 
more compelling argument for the proposition that there are no alternatives 
at all, and that even a discriminatory law should survive strict scrutiny. In 
other words, if all of California’s regulatory options necessarily involve a 
discriminatory CI score, then there are no alternatives and the law must be 
upheld, even if there are several choices of which type of discriminatory 
regime to enact.  
On the other hand, if the only alternative that the court provides can be 
shown not to produce the benefits California desires to serve its legitimate 
local purpose, this is another strong argument that there are in fact no 
alternatives. This is the result if California’s alternative is to enact a CI-less 
carbon tax or simply strip the CI from the LCFS. In either case, it would 
not capture the true GHG impact of the fuels, and would encourage oppor-
tunistic “fuel shuffling” to avoid the impact of the LCFS. 257 For example, a 
Midwestern producer whose lifecycle emissions are 10 percent higher than a 
California producer’s (in terms o� fuel consumed in California) might re-
ceive treatment in the market as if its emissions were equal to the 
California producer’s, as long as the fuels are chemically identical. Califor-
nia would be operating a regulatory regime that significantly 
underestimated GHG emissions, and California would not be able to accu-
rately say that it had reduced its total GHG emissions as required by the 
overall purpose of AB 32.  
Implicit in these issues is the question o� how effective a state’s regime 
must be. That is, if California had to show that its regime, whether the 
LCFS or a carbon tax, would actually make measurable decreases in global 
climate change, this would probably be fatal; California produces just a 
fraction of the United States’ total emissions, which are in turn just 19 
percent of global emissions—so a 20 percent reduction in California emis-
sions alone, of which the LCFS is just a small part, could not meaningfully 
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change the global climate.258 On the other hand, if California can enact a 
discriminatory law that has no alternatives, even if it merely makes the 
“right moves” but does not reduce climate change, it is in a better position. 
If California’s regime goes any distance at all towards its stated goal, it 
might pass muster. This consideration is analogous to the divisive  
discussion of redressability in the standing context in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
There, the majority and dissent split over whether the states and other 
plaintiffs had Article III standing, given that—even if the EPA regulated 
motor vehicle emissions—the harm might nevertheless continue.259  
Finally, an issue left unaddressed is what bearing, if any, the seriousness 
of a problem the state is trying to fix has on consideration of alternatives. 
For example, if the LCFS regulated not carbon but instead a pollutant that 
only caused mildly itchy skin in a small portion of the population, would 
the suitability of the alternatives be less important? As above, this is a ques-
tion on which the case law provides little guidance. In Maine v. Taylor, there 
was no discussion o� how the seriousness of the invasive species problem 
bore on the stringency of measures Maine could undertake. It stands to 
reason, however, that the greater the peril, the more seriously courts should 
take attempts to curb it.  
B. Ninth Circuit Appeal 
Within days of the judgment from the Eastern District of California, 
the State appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit then granted a 
stay of the district court’s injunction on April 23, so the LCFS remained in 
effect pending the outcome of the appeal.260 In their briefs, the parties 
largely reasserted their allegations from the district court. The State ap-
peared much more concerned with the consideration of alternatives.261 
After all, it knew that if the Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge O’Neill that 
the strict scrutiny test was appropriate and that global warming was a legit-
imate local purpose, the State could win if it could only convince the Ninth 
Circuit that there were no alternatives.  
The State emphasized its technical expertise and precision in develop-
ing the LCFS, leaning on the State’s serious scientific objectives.262 It 
implied, therefore, that it was not discriminating due to any forbidden 
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protectionist motive; rather, it was using scientific principles to measure 
and reduce the amount of carbon emitted in the whole lifecycle o� fuels in 
California.263 California also argued forcefully that, even if the strict scruti-
ny test applied, there were no viable alternatives for the three main goals: 
reducing carbon intensity, quantifying carbon intensity, and spurring devel-
opment o� lower-carbon fuels.264 Since the LCFS “reduces the carbon 
intensity of transportation fuels,” the State argued, it “captures emission 
reductions that cannot be captured by measures requiring GHG reductions 
from vehicles or fewer vehicle miles traveled.”265 Furthermore, the State 
argued that lifecycle analysis—looking at every input to fuels’ carbon inten-
sity—was “the only scientifically accepted and effective approach to 
accurately quantify emissions fuels and increase the use o� lower carbon 
fuels.”266 Finally, the “LCFS also spurs the innovation of next-generation 
fuels that are necessary to achieve the emissions reductions.”267  
In support of its conclusion that “[n]o alternative regulation can achieve 
these objectives,” California showed that the suggested alternatives demon-
strably would not achieve the objectives.268 For example, regulations of 
tailpipe emissions would not suffice because “California already regulates 
vehicle emissions,” and the State had shown “that it cannot secure an addi-
tional 16 million metric tons of emissions reductions yearly by solely 
regulating vehicle emissions and ignoring the types o� fuel consumed”—
reductions the LCFS would achieve.269 Similarly, it argued that what the 
district court called a non-discriminatory LCFS would amount to 
“[s]electively choosing the elements of a fuel’s lifecycle,” which would “ren-
der[] the determination of carbon intensity meaningless.”270 
The Ninth Circuit handed down a dormant Commerce Clause decision 
in late August 2013 that appears to have presaged its thinking as it prepared 
the Rocky Mountain Farmers Union opinion: in Association des Eleveurs de 
Canards v. Harris, the court held that a California law banning foie gras (the 
fatty liver o� force-fed ducks) neither discriminated against interstate com-
merce nor directly regulated interstate commerce.271 In holding that the law 
was nondiscriminatory, the court pointed out that location had nothing to 
do with the ban: all products based on the force-feeding of ducks, no matter 
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where they originated, were equally affected.272 This suggested that the 
court was sympathetic to the authority of states to regulate materials for 
moral or ethical reasons, even if such regulation would eliminate a market 
for a good. At the same time, the foie gras opinion left open the possibility 
that bans taking location into account, arguably including the LCFS, would 
incur a different result.   
Next, the court held that the foie gras law did not directly regulate in-
terstate commerce (was not extraterritorial) because it was not aimed at 
out-of-state producers—it applied equally in- and out-of-state—and be-
cause it only banned a way of producing foie gras, rather than banning the 
entire product.273 This was the strongest signal that the Ninth Circuit 
might look favorably upon the LCFS: as in the foie gras ban, the LCFS 
took a purely procedural look at products, without regard to location. Simi-
larly, the LCFS did not ban high-CI corn ethanol, but merely made it more 
expensive to sell it in California.  
On September 18, 2013, the Ninth Circuit released its opinion in the 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union case, which now bore the caption Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey.274 In a consolidated opinion deciding the 
dormant Commerce Clause challenge to both the state’s crude oil standards 
as well as the LCFS, Judge Gould wrote for the majority that the LCFS 
neither facially discriminated against interstate commerce nor regulated 
extraterritorially.275 The court vacated the preliminary injunction and re-
manded to the district court to determine whether the LCFS 
“discriminate[d] in purpose or in practical effect.”276 If it did neither, the 
court of appeals directed the district court to apply the Pike balancing 
test.277 
In reaching this result, Judge Gould painted a sympathetic picture of 
California’s legislation and regulations.278 He noted initially that California 
“has long been in the vanguard of efforts to protect the environment, with a 
particular concern for emissions from the transportation sector.”279 Gould 
recounted California’s pioneering role in the Clean Air Act’s development, 
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for example, leading to its leadership in passing AB 32.280 He noted that 
the LCFS served an important purpose in California’s comprehensive at-
tempts to lower its greenhouse gas emissions: it was the supply-side 
regulation aiming at the sources of GHG emissions that the other two 
prongs of California’s vehicle standards could not reach.281 
Gould first framed his analysis by determining “which ethanol path-
ways are suitable for comparison,” because without this step, he could not 
find whether similarly-situated producers were being treated differently 
and therefore discriminated against.282 He wrote that “[e]ntities are similar-
ly situated for constitutional purposes if their products compete against 
each other in a single market.”283 Therefore, the district court erred in 
“excluding Brazilian ethanol from its analysis,” which would have shown 
that California was not discriminating against out-of-state producers.284  
Furthermore, the district court erred by “ignoring GHG emissions re-
lated to: (1) the electricity used to power the conversion process, (2) the 
efficiency of the ethanol plant, and (3) the transportation of the feedstock, 
ethanol, and co-products,” which were factors correlated with location but 
were independently valid ways to determine CI.285 Without a careful analy-
sis of the differences between pathways, Gould concluded, “we cannot 
understand whether the challenged regulation responds to genuine threats 
o� harm or to the mere out-of-state status of an ethanol pathway.”286 
Most importantly, Gould recognized that merely treating location as a 
factor was not facially discriminatory; the State could still show that there 
was “ ‘some reason, apart from their origin, to treat’ ” different regions’ 
products differently.287 In other words, since there were valid scientific 
bases above and beyond mere location of origin to treat the different path-
ways differently, they did not facially discriminate.288 The default pathways 
in Table 6 “do categorize fuels by their origin, but the carbon intensity 
values on that table are not assigned based on the out-of-state character o� 
                                                                                                                      
 280. Id. at 1078–79. 
    281. Id. at 1079–80. The “Tailpipe Standards,” as CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1 
(2012) is known, established “progressively stricter emissions limits for new vehicles,” 
whereas the vehicle miles traveled (“VMT Standards”), CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65080–81 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 800 of 2013 Reg.Sess., all 2013-2014 1st Ex.Sess. laws, and Res. 
Ch. 123), integrated “regional land use, housing, and transportation planning to reduce the 
number of ‘vehicle miles traveled’ ” annually. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 
730 F.3d at 1079–80. 
 282 Id. at 1088.  
 283. Id.  
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 1089. 
 287. Id. (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).  
 288. Id. 
     
224 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 3:1 
fuels”; instead, they were assigned based on objective principles.289 There-
fore, there was no facial discrimination.290 
Likewise, Gould made short work of the argument that California was 
regulating in a protectionist manner.291 Instead, he demonstrated that the 
regulations provided no special economic benefit to California.292 Moreo-
ver, California did not need to alter its regime simply because ethanol 
producers in the Midwest were more likely to be close to higher-carbon 
sources of electricity; “the dormant Commerce Clause does not guarantee 
that ethanol producers may compete on the terms they find most conven-
ient.”293  
Finally, Gould concluded that it was not facially discriminatory to 
“draw one of the regional categories along its boundary” when California 
defined itself as a region in Table 6.294 Again here, he concluded that the 
State had acted reasonably in using its political boundary as a category to 
compute CI, as long as it continued to treat sources evenhandedly.295 The 
generalizations in Table 6 merely “balance the desire for a precise assess-
ment with the need to reduce the compliance costs of the system.”296 
Regarding extraterritoriality, Gould wrote that the “Fuel Standard reg-
ulates only the California market,” and would not control the behavior of 
out-of-state firms.297 It could merely incentivize their behavior, and there-
fore it did not regulate extraterritorially.298 Furthermore, the requirement 
that blenders “report any material change to a pathway’s production and 
transportation process before it can generate Fuel Standard credits” was not 
extraterritorial regulation, because it only applied when a blender sought to 
continue selling its goods in California.299 
From a policy standpoint, Gould acknowledged both the dire need that 
prompted California to legislate in this way, and the importance of defer-
ring somewhat to states’ autonomy in our federal system.300 Moreover, a 
federalist argument helped Gould conclude that this statute did not put the 
nation at risk of economic Balkanization.301 The Plaintiffs had urged that 
California’s law would encourage other states to adopt similar but not iden-
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tical legislation of their own, which would create an unworkable mix o� 
laws, crippling interstate commerce.302 Gould dismissed this concern, re-
marking that “[i]f we were to invalidate regulation every time another state 
considered a complementary statute, we would destroy the states’ ability to 
experiment with regulation.”303 
 In general, therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s majority ruling found 
that California’s careful scientific choices defeated the broad-brush picture 
of the dormant Commerce Clause that the Plaintiffs had put forward. For 
the purposes o� facial discrimination, the court held, reasons matter: since 
California had well-reasoned methods behind its choices o� how to calculate 
CI, it was not discriminatory.304   
The court remanded to the district court to determine whether the 
LCFS discriminated in purpose or in practical effect. Of course, Gould 
advocated strongly in dicta that California had no discriminatory purpose, 
and demonstrated that the LCFS did not on the whole produce a discrimi-
natory effect on interstate commerce given the low CI o� Brazilian 
sugarcane.305 These remarks are forceful suggestions to the lower court not 
to hold that the strict scrutiny test applies for these reasons. If the lower 
court agrees with Gould’s suggestions, it is then directed to apply the Pike 
balancing test, and determine whether the LCFS imposes burdens on inter-
state commerce that are “ ‘clearly excessive’ in relation to its local 
benefits.”306 
Judge Murguia filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part.307 She dissented fully from the Court’s opinion regarding the 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis of the LCFS.308 She objected to the 
majority’s focus on the statute’s purpose to help determine whether it dis-
criminated; instead, she would “look only to the text of the LCFS to 
determine if it facially discriminates against out-of-state ethanol.”309 From 
Supreme Court precedents, she reasoned that any statute “according more 
preferential treatment” to in-state parties at the expense of out-of-state 
parties would be facially discriminatory.310 In Murguia’s view, this reasoning 
is appropriate because the majority should have placed its judgments about 
California’s reasonableness in the second step of the test, when it examined 
                                                                                                                      
 302. Appellees’ Brief at 44, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 
(9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135). 
 303. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1105. 
 304. Id. at 1089–90. 
 305. See, e.g., id. at 1090, 1092–93, 1096, 1105–06. 
 306. Id. at 1078. 
 307. Id. at 1107–10. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 1108. 
 310. Id. 
     
226 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 3:1 
whether the purported reasons for the discrimination were valid.311 In other 
words, the correct application of the strict scrutiny test would not involve 
any consideration of the State’s reasons for enacting a potentially discrimi-
natory statute until after the court determines, from the text alone, whether 
the statute does discriminate.312 
Having determined that the LCFS facially discriminated based on its 
text alone, Murguia would have held that there were alternatives to the 
discrimination and therefore the LCFS was not valid.313 Murguia’s analysis 
here was a little puzzling: she suggested that California could have “treated 
ethanol produced in efficient plants more favorably than ethanol from 
inefficient plants—rather than taking the shortcut of assuming that plants 
outside of California are less efficient,” without considering what would 
have happened if California plants tended to be more efficient than out-of-
state plants.314 She also quoted counsel for California at oral argument 
stating that “ ‘It’s not our position that the LCFS is the only way the lifecy-
cle could be used. It’s our position that the lifecycle is the only way to accu-
accurately measure [GHG] emissions from transportation fuels’ ” without 
addressing the inherent problem with that sentence: if there are alterna-
tives, but those alternatives do not “accurately measure” the substance being 
measured, are they truly alternatives?315 
C. Pike Arguments 
If the lower court on remand finds that the LCFS does not discrimi-
nate in purpose or effect, the program will be subjected to the much more 
forgiving Pike balancing test. That test is applied to state laws that do not 
facially discriminate and do not regulate extraterritoriality, but that have 
effects in interstate commerce.316 There, courts will strike down the state 
law only if the effects on interstate commerce outweigh the putative local 
benefits of the law.317 By its terms and in its application, this test is much 
more forgiving to states. In stark contrast with the strict scrutiny test, un-
der which virtually every state law is deemed unconstitutional, the Pike test 
rarely results in the law being struck down.  
Under a Pike balancing test, the court will evaluate whether the burdens 
on interstate commerce were outweighed by the benefits the State obtained 
from the regime. Here, the burdens are that Midwestern producers are 
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subject to higher compliance costs than California producers, and as a re-
sult, they may lose market share over time. California buyers may face 
disincentives to buy Midwestern ethanol, because its higher CI value would 
be costly for them.318 Due to California’s large size, this would potentially 
mean significant losses.  
In its briefs, the State argued that, even if the Plaintiffs were correct 
that the Midwestern ethanol would lose market share over time, this loss 
did not amount to a dormant Commerce Clause violation. As the State 
noted, the Plaintiffs’ “bleak scenarios” about the burden imposed upon 
them “lack evidentiary support.”319 Moreover, the State insisted, it had 
procedures in place to allow producers to request an individualized CI 
score, so that no producer would be forced to operate under an unduly high 
averaged score.320  
The strongest argument for the State here, of course, is that Pike is a 
balancing test: even if the Midwestern producers would face systemic and 
significant losses compared with other producers, these losses must be 
examined in the context of the threat of climate change. California’s sover-
eign interest in protecting itself, both as a State and as a land-owner, and in 
protecting its citizens and businesses, from the projected damage wrought 
by climate change would almost certainly outweigh partial, and scientifical-
ly justified, losses by some Midwestern ethanol producers. On balance, 
therefore, the LCFS will almost certainly survive a Pike balancing test on 
remand.  
V. POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
After the mostly-favorable Ninth Circuit ruling, California has less to 
fear, for the time being. It is still possible that the Plaintiffs will seek en 
banc review or certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Otherwise, 
on remand to the Eastern District of California, the lower court could also 
find that the statute fails the more deferential Pike balancing test. However, 
given how lenient the Pike test generally is, it is unlikely that this statute 
would fail. This is especially likely given how great the benefits are that 
California hopes to obtain from reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
If the LCFS must still be changed after en banc review or a potential 
ruling by the Supreme Court that the statute is discriminatory, California 
would need to alter the discriminatory aspects of the law. The district court 
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focused mainly on Table 6 of the LCFS, wherein the State appeared to add 
10 percent CI to all Midwestern corn and ethanol.321 The State could there-
fore rewrite this section and issue more findings about precisely why the 10 
percent figures were appropriate. Alternatively, it could recalculate the 
figures entirely, and ensure that the figures truly reflect the CI of the fuels.  
Of course, there would be serious difficulties with this approach. The 
whole idea o� Table 6 was to reduce the administrative burden, both on the 
state and on regulated entities: the average CIs were intended to save time 
and not require parties to painstakingly calculate individual CI values. 
Additionally, the LCFS allows entities to request a customized CI value; 
this alternative approach might essentially eliminate that option and make 
it the default. All fuels might receive a customized CI value, and the pro-
gram would probably require far greater funding and resources to  
administer. 
If the Ninth Circuit en banc, or the Supreme Court, were to adopt the 
view that all consideration of transportation was discriminatory, California 
would be in a much more difficult bind. The State might then need to strip 
its CI calculations of everything but the behavior taking place in California 
and the chemical properties of the fuels. This would, as the State pointed 
out in its briefs, render the CI illogical and toothless: California would be 
expending its resources to regulate fuels that were chemically identical, and 
perhaps to regulate the seed to tank production of California ethanol, but it 
would not be able to accurately measure how much carbon it was reducing 
through its efforts. The out-of-state carbon inputs, including transporta-
tion, would go uncalculated.322  
If transportation is indeed discriminatory, it may make more sense for 
California to scrap the LCFS regime in favor of something like a carbon 
tax. However, such a tax could implicate the dormant Commerce Clause 
case law on state taxes—the same strict scrutiny analysis could apply to a 
state attempting to impose tariffs on out-of-state goods.323  
However, for the moment, the LCFS appears to be out of the woods. 
As described in Section IV.C, it has every chance of surviving the Pike 
balancing test, and there is no reason to believe now that the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s holdings about the absence of discrimination in the LCFS will be 
overturned.  
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CONCLUSION 
The Rocky Mountain Farmers Union case provides a window into the 
dormant Commerce Clause issues states will face as they enact laws to 
address global climate change. First, they will have to dodge the strict 
scrutiny test by enacting laws that courts agree are non-discriminatory. If 
they fail, as California did here, they must demonstrate that they had no 
plausible alternatives in the service of a legitimate local purpose. Despite an 
otherwise-unfavorable ruling, Judge O’Neill’s opinion ruled that global 
warming was a legitimate local purpose, apparently for all states, without 
question. This will be a valuable piece of case law for other states fighting 
similar challenges, as it apparently absolves them from having to argue 
about their specific, factual harms from climate change. Ultimately, howev-
er, it makes more sense given the logic of the dormant Commerce Clause, 
and given the unique challenges of climate change, for future courts to 
employ the Pike balancing test in considering a carefully-crafted law like the 
LCFS. This approach will allow courts properly to balance the state’s ap-
proach facing a considerable threat to health and safety.  
 
